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Summoning is a task between two parties, Alice and Bob, with distributed networks of agents in space-time.
Bob gives Alice a random quantum state, known to him but not her, at some point. She is required to return
the state at some later point, belonging to a subset defined by communications received from Bob at other
points. Many results about summoning, including the impossibility of unrestricted summoning tasks and the
necessary conditions for specific types of summoning tasks to be possible, follow directly from the quantum no-
cloning theorem and the relativistic no-superluminal-signalling principle. The impossibility of cloning devices
can be derived from the impossibility of superluminal signalling and the projection postulate, together with
assumptions about the devices’ location-independent functioning. In this qualified sense, known summoning
results follow from the causal structure of space-time and the properties of quantum measurements. Bounds on
the fidelity of approximate cloning can be similarly derived. Bit commitment protocols and other cryptographic
protocols based on the no-summoning theorem can thus be proven secure against some classes of post-quantum
but non-signalling adversaries.
INTRODUCTION
To define a summoning task[1, 2], we consider two par-
ties, Alice and Bob, who each have networks of collaborat-
ing agents occupying non-overlapping secure sites throughout
space-time. At some point P , Bob’s local agent gives Alice’s
local agent a state |ψ〉. The physical form of |ψ〉 and the di-
mension of its Hilbert space H are pre-agreed; Bob knows
a classical description of |ψ〉, but from Alice’s perspective it
is a random state drawn from the uniform distribution on H .
At further pre-agreed points (which are often taken to all be
in the causal future of P , though this is not necessary), Bob’s
agents send classical communications in pre-agreed form, sat-
isfying pre-agreed constraints, to Alice’s local agents, which
collectively determine a set of one or more valid return points.
Alice may manipulate and propagate the state as she wishes,
but must return it to Bob at one of the valid return points. We
say a given summoning task is possible if there is some al-
gorithm that allows Alice to ensure that the state is returned
to a valid return point for any valid set of communications
received from Bob.
The “no-summoning theorem” [1] states that summoning
tasks in Minkowski space are not always possible. We write
Q ≻ P if the space-time point Q is in the causal future of
the point P , and Q ⊁ P otherwise; we write Q  P if ei-
ther Q ≻ P or Q = P , and Q  P otherwise. Now, for
example, consider a task in which Bob may request at one of
two “call” points ci ≻ P that the state be returned at a corre-
sponding return point ri ≻ ci, where r2  c1 and r1  c2.
An algorithm that guarantees that Alice will return the state
at r1 if it is called at c1 must work independently of whether
a call is also made at c2, since no information can propagate
from c2 to r1; similarly if 1 and 2 are exchanged. If calls were
made at both c1 and c2, such an algorithmwould thus generate
two copies of |ψ〉 at the space-like separated points r1 and r2,
violating the no-cloning theorem. This distinguishes relativis-
tic quantum theory from both relativistic classical mechanics
and non-relativistic quantummechanics, in which summoning
tasks are always possible provided that any valid return point
is in the (causal) future of the start point P .
Further evidence for seeing summoning tasks as character-
ising fundamental features of relativistic quantum theory was
given by Hayden and May [3], who considered tasks in which
a request is made at precisely one from a pre-agreed set of
call points {c1, . . . , cn}; a request at ci requires the state to
be produced at the corresponding return point ri ≻ ci. They
showed that, if the start point P is in the causal past of all
the call points, then the task is possible if and only if no two
causal diamonds Di = {x : ri  x  ci} are spacelike sep-
arated. That is, the task is possible unless the no-cloning and
no-superluminal-signalling principles directly imply its im-
possibility. Wu et al. have presented a more efficient code for
this task [4]. Another natural type of summoning task allows
any number of calls to be made at call points, requiring that
the state be produced at any one of the corresponding return
points. Perhaps counter-intuitively, this can be shown to be a
strictly harder version of the task [5]. It is possible if and only
if the causal diamonds can be ordered in sequence so that the
return point of any diamond in the sequence is in the causal
future of all call points of earlier diamonds in the sequence.
Again, the necessity of this condition follows (with a few ex-
tra steps) from the no-superluminal-signalling and no-cloning
theorems [5].
The constraints on summoning have cryptographic applica-
tions, since they can effectively force Alice to make choices
before revealing them to Bob. Perhaps the simplest and most
striking of these is a novel type of unconditionally secure rel-
ativistic quantum bit commitment protocol, in which Alice
sends the unknown state at light speed in one of two direc-
tions, depending on her committed bit [6]. The fidelity bounds
on approximate quantum cloning imply [6] the sum-binding
2security condition
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 +
2
d+ 1
, (1)
where d = dim(H) is the dimension of the Hilbert space of
the unknown state and pb is the probability of Alice success-
fully unveiling bit value b.
Summoning is also a natural primitive in distributed quan-
tum computation, in which algorithms may effectively sum-
mon a quantum state produced by a subroutine to some com-
putation node that depends on other computed or incoming
data.
From a fundamental perspective, the (im)possibility of var-
ious summoning tasks may be seen either as results about rel-
ativistic quantum theory or as candidate axioms for a reformu-
lation of that theory. They also give a way of exploring and
characterising the space of theories generalising relativistic
quantum theory. From a cryptographic perspective, we would
like to understand precisely which assumptions are neces-
sary for the security of summoning-based protocols. These
motivations are particularly strong given the relationship be-
tween no-summoning theorems and no-signalling, since we
know that quantum key distribution and other protocols can
be proven secure based on no-signalling principles alone. In
what follows, we characterise that relationship more precisely,
and discuss in particular the sense in which summoning-based
bit commitment protocols are secure against potentially post-
quantum but non-signalling participants. These are partici-
pants who may have access to technology that relies on some
unknown theory beyond quantum theory. They may thus be
able to carry out operations that quantum theory suggests is
impossible. However, their technology must not allow them
to violate a no-signalling principle. Exactly what this implies
depends on which no-signalling principle is invoked. We turn
next to discussing the relevant possibilities.
NO-SIGNALLING PRINCIPLES AND NO-CLONING
No-signalling principles
The relativistic no-superluminal-signalling principle states
that no classical or quantum information can be transmitted
at faster than light speed. We can frame this operationally by
considering a general physical system that includes agents at
locations P1, . . . , Pn. Suppose that the agent at each Pi may
freely choose inputs labelled by Ai and receive outputs ai,
which may probabilistically depend on their and other inputs.
Let I = {i1, . . . , ib} and J = {j1, . . . jc} be sets of labels
of points such that Pik  Pjl for all k ∈ {1, . . . , b} and l ∈
{1, . . . , c}. Then we have
P (ai1 . . . aib |Ai1 . . . Aib) = (2)
p(ai1 . . . aib |Ai1 . . . AibAj1 . . . Ajc) .
In other words, outputs are independent of spacelike or future
inputs.
The quantumno-signalling principle for an n-partite system
composed of non-interacting subsystems states that measure-
ment outcomes on any subset of subsystems are independent
of measurement choices on the others. If we label the mea-
surement choices on subsystem i by Ai, and the outcomes for
this choice by ai, then we have
P (ai1 . . . aim |Ai1 . . . Aim) = P (ai1 . . . aim |A1 . . . An) . (3)
That is, so long as the subsystems are non-interacting, the out-
puts for any subset are independent of the inputs for the com-
plementary subset, regardless of their respective locations in
space-time.
The no-signalling principle for a generalised non-signalling
theory extends this to any notional device with localised pairs
of inputs (generalising measurement choices) and outputs
(generalising outcomes). As in the quantum case, this is sup-
posed to hold true regardless of whether the sites of the lo-
calised input/output ports are spacelike separated. General-
ized non-signalling theories may include, for example, the hy-
pothetical bipartite Popescu-Rohrlich boxes [7], which maxi-
mally violate the CHSH inequality, while still precluding sig-
nalling between agents at each site.
The no-cloning theorem
The standard derivation of the no-cloning theorem [8, 9]
assumes a hypothetical quantum cloning device. A quantum
cloning deviceD should take two input states, a general quan-
tum state |ψ〉 and a reference state |0〉, independent of |ψ〉.
Since D follows the laws of quantum theory, it must act lin-
early. Now we have
D |ψ〉 |0〉 = |ψ〉 |ψ〉 , D |ψ′〉 |0〉 = |ψ′〉 |ψ′〉 , (4)
for a faithful cloning device, for any states |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉. Sup-
pose that 〈ψ′|ψ〉 = 0 and that |φ〉 = a |ψ〉 + b |ψ′〉 is nor-
malised. We also have
D |φ〉 |0〉 = |φ〉 |φ〉 , (5)
which contradicts linearity.
To derive the no-cloning theorem without appealing to lin-
earity, we need to consider quantum theory as embedded
within a more general theory that does not necessarily respect
linearity. We can then consistently consider a hypothetical
post-quantum cloning deviceD which accepts quantum states
|ψ〉 and |0〉 as inputs, and produces two copies of |ψ〉 as out-
puts:
D |ψ〉 |0〉 = |ψ〉 |ψ〉 . (6)
We will suppose that the cloning device functions in this way
independent of the history of the input state. We will also
suppose that it does not violate any other standard physical
principles: in particular, if it is applied at Q then it does not
3act retrocausally to influence the outcomes of measurements
at earlier points P ≺ Q.
We can now extend the cloning device to a bipartite device
comprising a maximally entangled quantum state, with a stan-
dard quantummeasurement device at one end, and the cloning
device followed by a standard quantum measurement device
at the other end. This extended device accepts classical inputs
(measurement choices) and produces classical outputs (mea-
surement outcomes) at both ends.
If we now further assume that the joint output probabilities
for this extended device, for any set of inputs, are indepen-
dent of the locations of its components, then we can derive a
contradiction with the relativistic no-superluminal signalling
principle. First suppose that the two ends are timelike sep-
arated, with the cloning device end at point Q and the other
end at point P ≺ Q. A complete projective measurement
at P then produces a pure state at Q in any standard version
of quantum theory. The cloning device then clones this pure
state. Different measurement choices at P produce different
ensembles of pure states at Q. These ensembles correspond
to the same mixed state before cloning, but to distinguishable
mixtures after cloning. The measurement device atQ can dis-
tinguish these mixtures. Now if we take the first end to be
at a point P ′ spacelike separated from Q, by hypothesis the
output probabilities remain unchanged. This allows measure-
ment choices at P ′ to be distinguished by measurements atQ,
and so gives superluminal signalling [10].
It is important to note that the assumption of location-
independence is not logically necessary, nor does it fol-
low from the relativistic no-superluminal-signalling principle
alone. Assuming that quantum states collapse in some well
defined and localized way as a result of measurements, one
can consistently extend relativistic quantum theory to include
hypothetical devices that read out a classical description of
the local reduced density matrix at any given point, i.e. the
local quantum state that is obtained by taking into account
(only) collapses within the past light cone [11]. This means
that measurement events at P , which we take to induce col-
lapses, are taken into account by the readout device at Q if
and only if P ≺ Q. Given such a readout device, one can
certainly clone pure quantum states. The device behaves dif-
ferently, when applied to a subsystem of an entangled system,
depending on whether the second subsystem is measured in-
side or outside the past light cone of the point at which the
device is applies. It thus does not satisfy the assumptions of
the previous paragraph.
The discussion above also shows that quantum theory aug-
mented by cloning or readout devices is not a generalized non-
signalling theory. For consider again a maximally entangled
bipartite quantum system with one subsystem at space-time
point P and the other at a space-like separated point P ′. Sup-
pose that the Hamiltonian is zero, and that the subsystem at
P ′ will propagate undisturbed to point Q ≻ P . Suppose that
a measurement device may carry out any complete projective
measurement at P , and that at Q there is a cloning device fol-
lowed by another measurement device on the joint (original
and cloned) system. As above, different measurement choices
at P produce different ensembles of pure states at Q, which
correspond to the same mixed state before cloning, but to dis-
tinguishable mixtures after cloning. The measurement device
atQ can distinguish these mixtures. The output (measurement
outcome) probabilities at Q thus depend on the inputs (mea-
surement choices) at P , contradicting Eqn. (3). Assuming
that nature is described by a generalized non-signalling the-
ory thus gives another reason for excluding cloning or read-
out devices, without assuming that their behaviour is location-
independent.
In summary, neither the no-cloning theorem nor crypto-
graphic security proofs based on it can be derived purely from
consistency with special relativity. They require further as-
sumptions about the behaviour of post-quantum devices avail-
able to participants or adversaries. Although this was noted
when cryptography based on the no-signalling principle was
first introduced [12], it perhaps deserves re-emphasis.
On the positive side, given these further assumptions, one
can prove not only the no-cloning theorem, but also quantita-
tive bounds on the optimal fidelities attainable by approximate
cloning devices for qubits [10] and qudits [13]. In particular,
one can show [13] that any approximate universal cloning de-
vice that produces output states ρ0 and ρ1 given a pure input
qudit state |ψ〉 satisfies the fidelity sum bound
〈ψ|ρ0|ψ〉+ 〈ψ|ρ1|ψ〉 ≤ 1 +
2
d+ 1
. (7)
It is worth stressing that (with the given assumptions) this
bound applies for any approximate cloning strategy, with any
entangled states allowed as input.
SUMMONING-BASED BIT COMMITMENTS AND
NO-SIGNALLING
We recall now the essential idea of the flying qudit bit com-
mitment protocol presented in Ref. [6], in its idealized form.
We suppose that space-time is Minkowski and that both par-
ties, the committer (Alice) and the recipient (Bob), have ar-
bitrarily efficient technology, limited only by physical princi-
ples. In particular, we assume they both can carry out error-
free quantum operations instantaneously and can send clas-
sical and quantum information at light speed without errors.
They agree in advance on some space-time point P , to which
they have independent secure access, where the commitment
will commence.
We suppose too that Bob can keep a state secure fromAlice
somewhere in the past of P and arrange to transfer it to her
at P . Alice’s operations on the state can then be kept secure
fromBob unless and until she chooses to return information to
Bob at some point(s) in the future of P . We also suppose that
Alice can send any relevant states at light speed in prescribed
directions along secure quantum channels, either by ordinary
physical transmission or by teleportation.
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opposite spatial directions within that frame. For simplicity
we neglect the y and z coordinates and take the speed of light
c = 1. Let P = (0, 0) be the origin in the coordinates (x, t)
and the opposite two spatial directions be defined by the vec-
tors v0 = (−1, 0) and v1 = (1, 0).
Before the commitment begins, Bob generates a random
pure qudit |ψ〉 ∈ Cd. This is chosen from the uniform distribu-
tion, and encoded in some pre-agreed physical system. Again
idealizing, we assume the dimensions of this system are neg-
ligible, and treat it as pointlike. Bob keeps his qudit secure
until the point P , where he gives it to Alice. To commit to the
bit i ∈ {0, 1}, Alice sends the state |ψ〉 along a secure chan-
nel at light speed in the direction vi. That is, to commit to 0,
she sends the qudit along the line L0 = {(−t, t), t > 0}; to
commit to 1, she sends it along the line L1 = {(t, t), t > 0}.
For simplicity, we suppose here that Alice directly trans-
mits the state along a secure channel. This allows Alice the
possibility of unveiling her commitment at any point along
the transmitted light ray. To unveil the committed bit 0, Alice
returns |ψ〉 to Bob at some pointQ0 on L0; to unveil the com-
mitted bit 1, Alice returns |ψ〉 to Bob at some pointQ1 on L1.
Bob then tests that the returned qudit is |ψ〉 by carrying out
the projective measurement defined by Pψ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| and its
complement (I − Pψ). If he gets the outcome corresponding
to Pψ , he accepts the commitment as honestly unveiled; if not,
he has detected Alice cheating.
Now, given any strategy of Alice’s at P , there is an optimal
state ρ0 she can return to Bob atQ0 to maximise the chance of
passing his test there, i.e. to maximize the fidelity 〈ψ|ρ0|ψ〉.
There is similarly an optimal state ρ1 that she can return at
Q1, maximizing 〈ψ|ρ1|ψ〉. The relativistic no-superluminal-
signalling principle implies that her ability to return ρ0 at Q0
cannot depend on whether she chooses to return ρ1 at Q1, or
vice versa. Hence she may return both (although this violates
the protocol). The bound (7) on the approximate cloning fi-
delities implies that
〈ψ|ρ0|ψ〉+ 〈ψ|ρ1|ψ〉 ≤ 1 +
2
d+ 1
. (8)
Since the probability of Alice successfully unveiling the bit
value b by this strategy is
pb = 〈ψ|ρb|ψ〉 , (9)
this gives the sum-binding security condition for the bit com-
mitment protocol
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 +
2
d+ 1
. (10)
Recall that the bound (7) follows from the relativistic no-
superluminal-signalling condition together with the location-
independence assumption for a device based on a hypotheti-
cal post-quantum cloning device applied to one subsystem of
a bipartite entangled state. Alternatively, it follows from as-
suming that any post-quantum devices operate within a gen-
eralized non-signalling theory. The bit commitment security
thus also follows from either of these assumptions.
Security against post-quantum no-superluminal-signalling
adversaries?
It is a strong assumption that any post-quantum theory
should be a generalized non-signalling theory satisfying Eqn.
(3). So it is natural to ask whether cryptographic security can
be maintained with the weaker assumption that other partici-
pants or adversaries are able to carry out quantum operations
and may also be equipped with post-quantum devices, but do
not have the power to signal superluminally. It is instructive
to understand the limitations of this scenario for protocols be-
tween mistrustful parties capable of quantum operations, such
as the bit commitment protocol just discussed.
The relevant participant here is Alice, who begins with a
quantum state at P and may send components along the light-
like lines PQ0 and PQ1. Without loss of generality we as-
sume these are the only components: she could also send com-
ponents in other directions, but relativistic no-superluminal-
signalling means that they cannot then influence her states at
Q0 or Q1.
At any points X0 and X1 on the lightlike lines, before Al-
ice has applied any post-quantum devices, the approximate
cloning fidelity bound again implies that fidelities of the re-
spective components ρX0 and ρX1 satisfy
〈ψ|ρX0 |ψ〉+ 〈ψ|ρX1 |ψ〉 ≤ 1 +
2
d+ 1
. (11)
Now, if Alice possesses a classical no-superluminal-
signalling device, such as a Popescu-Rohrlich box, with input
and output ports at X0 and X1, and her agents at these sites
input classical information uncorrelated with their quantum
states, she does not alter the fidelities 〈ψ|ρXi |ψ〉. Any subse-
quent operation may reduce the fidelities, but cannot increase
them. More generally, any operation involving the quantum
states and devices with purely classical inputs and outputs
cannot increase the fidelity sum bound (7). To see this, note
that any such operation could be paralleled by local operations
within quantum theory if the two states were held at the same
point, since hypothetical classical devices with separated pairs
of input and output ports are replicable by ordinary probabilis-
tic classical devices when the ports are all at the same site.
We need also to consider the possibility that Alice has no-
superluminal signalling devices with quantum inputs and out-
puts. At first sight these may seem unthreatening. For ex-
ample, while a device that sends the quantum input from X0
to the output at X1 and vice versa would certainly make the
protocol insecure – Alice could freely swap commitments to
0 and 1 – such a device would be signalling.
However, suppose that Alice’s agents each have local state
readout devices, which give Alice’s agent at X0 a classical
description of the density matrix ρX0 and Alice’s agent at X1
a classical description of the density matrix ρX1 . Suppose also
that Alice has carried out an approximate universal cloning at
P , creating mixed states ρX0 and ρX1 of the form
ρXi = pi |ψ〉 〈ψ|+ (1− pi)I , (12)
5where 0 < pi < 1. This is possible provided that p0 + p1 ≤
1 + 2
d+1
. From these, by applying their readout devices, each
agent can infer |ψ〉 locally. Alice’s outputs at Xi have no de-
pendence on the inputs at Xi¯. Nonetheless, this hypothetical
process would violate the security of the commitment to the
maximum extent possible, since it would give p0 + p1 = 2.
To ensure post-quantum security, our post-quantum theory
thus need assumptions – like those spelled out earlier – that
directly preclude state readout devices and other violations of
no-cloning bounds.
DISCUSSION
Classical and quantum relativistic bit commitment pro-
tocols have attracted much interest lately, both because of
their theoretical interest and because advances in theory [14]
and practical implementation [15–17] suggest that relativis-
tic cryptography may be in widespread use in the forseeable
future.
Much work on these topics is framed in models in which
two (or more) provers communicate with one (or more) ver-
ifiers, with the provers being unable to communicate with
one another during the protocol. Indeed, one round classical
relativistic bit commitment protocols give a natural physical
setting in which two (or more) separated provers communi-
cate with adjacent verifiers, with the communications timed
so that the provers cannot communicate between the commit-
ment and opening phases. The verifiers are also typically un-
able to communicate, but this is less significant given the form
of the protocols, and the verifiers are sometimes considered as
a single entity when the protocol is not explicitly relativistic.
Within the prover-verifier model, it has been shown that
no single-round two-prover classical bit commitment protocol
can be secure against post-quantum provers who are equipped
with generalized no-signalling devices [18]. It is interesting
to compare this result with the signalling-based security proof
for the protocol discussed above.
First, of course, the flying qudit protocol involves quantum
rather than classical communication between “provers” (Al-
ice’s agents) and “verifiers” (Bob’s agents).
Second, as presented, the flying qudit protocol involves
three agents for each party. However, a similar secure bit com-
mitment protocol can be defined using just two agents apiece.
For example, Alice’s agent at P could retain the qudit, while
remaining stationary in the given frame, to commit to 0, and
send it to Alice’s agent atQ1 (as before) to commit to 1. They
may unveil by returning the qudit at, respectively, (0, t) or
(t, t). In this variant, the commitment is not secure at the point
where the qudit is received, but it becomes secure in the causal
future of (t/2, t/2).
Third, the original flying qudit protocol illustrates a pos-
sibility in relativistic quantum cryptography that is not mo-
tivated (and so not normally considered) in standard multi-
prover bit commitment protocols. This is that, while there are
three provers, communication between them in some direc-
tions is possible (and required) during the protocol. Alice’s
agent at P must be able to send the quantum state to either
of the agents at Q0 or Q1; indeed, a general quantum strategy
requires her to send quantum information to both.
Fourth, the security proof of the flying qudit protocol can
be extended to generalised no-signalling theories. However,
the protocol is not secure if the committer may have post-
quantum devices that respect the no-superluminal signalling
principle, but are otherwise unrestricted. Security proofs re-
quire stronger assumptions, such as that the commmitter is
restricted to devices allowed by a generalized non-signalling
theory.
The same issue arises considering the post-quantum secu-
rity of quantum key distribution protocols [12]), which are
secure if a post-quantum eavesdropper is restricted by a gen-
eralised no-signalling theory but not if she is only restricted
by the no-superluminal-signalling principle. One distinction
is that quantum key distribution is a protocol between mu-
tually trusting parties, Alice and Bob, whereas bit commit-
ment protocols involve two mistrustful parties. It is true that
quantum key distribution still involves mistrust, in that Al-
ice and Bob mistrust the eavesdropper, Eve. However, if one
makes the standard cryptographic assumption that Alice’s and
Bob’s laboratories are secure, so that information about oper-
ations within them cannot propagate to Eve, one can justify a
stronger no-signalling principle [12]. Of course, the strength
of this justification may be questioned, given that one is postu-
lating unknown physics that could imply a form of light speed
signalling that cannot be blocked. But in any case, the justifi-
cation is not available when one considers protocols between
two mistrustful parties, such as bit commitment, and wants
to exclude the possibility that one party (in our case Alice)
cannot exploit post-quantum operations within her own labo-
ratories (which may be connected, forming a single extended
laboratory).
Our discussion assumed a background Minkowski space-
time, but generalizes to other space-times with standard causal
structure, where the causal relation ≺ is a partial ordering.
Neither standard quantum theory nor the usual form of the
no-superluminal signalling principle hold in space-times with
closed time-like curves, where two distinct points P and Q
may obey both P ≺ Q and Q ≺ P . Formulating consistent
theories in this context requires further assumptions (see for
example Ref. [19] for one analysis). The same is true of su-
perpositions of space-times with indefinite causal order [20].
We leave investigation of these cases for future work.
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